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Article
Jus Cogens: To Revise a Narrative
Sue S. Guan
Abstract
For a decade or so in the mid-twentieth century,
international policymakers, jurists, and scholars united briefly
around the concept of a “peremptory,” or jus cogens, norm. Latin
for “compelling law,” such “supernorms” were deemed nonderogable by states, and superior to treaty-based and customary
international law that traditionally constituted international
law.
International recognition of the concept of jus cogens was
formalized in 1969 through Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which voids any treaty that conflicts with
a jus cogens norm. Since then, however, the concept of jus cogens
has come under heavy criticism, most commonly for having little
(if any) practical ability to create legal rights and entitlements
that bind states and people. Today, the concept of a jus cogens
norm has faded into near irrelevance.
This Article explores the cause of the decline, and offers a
solution: a narrative shift. In particular, I explain that the cost
of state commitment to jus cogens is simply too high: no state
will agree to bind itself to an inflexible set of universal principles
so riddled with uncertainty and contradiction. For example, jus
cogens is expressed in the vocabulary of the absolute, yet its
binding nature remains largely contingent on state consent.
Moreover, its fundamentalist narrative denies any such
contingency or relevance of the political will of states or
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international actors—yet leaves open the basic question of what
norms constitute jus cogens. To that end, this Article offers a
normative framework focused on shifting the traditional
fundamentalist narrative towards a more realistic narrative,
which embraces a context-driven approach that is a familiar
aspect of traditional treaty negotiation and lowers the cost of
commitment to jus cogens norms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself as a member of the United Nations
International Law Commission (“ILC”) in 1963, involved in the
drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”). Ten years earlier, in 1953, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,
the ILC’s Special Rapporteur, had presented to the ILC the
following proposal: “A treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if
its performance involves an act which is illegal under
international law and if it is declared so to be by the
International Court of Justice.”1 According to Lauterpacht, there
existed certain peremptory norms, otherwise known as jus
cogens norms, that reflected “overriding principles of
international law”2 and:
[M]ay be regarded as constituting principles of
international public policy . . . expressive of rules of
international morality so cogent that an international
tribunal would consider them as forming part of those
principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations
which the International Court of Justice is bound to
apply . . . .3
Because you agree that such “overriding principles of
international law” exist and operate to bind courts in this way,
you—and the other members of the ILC—undertake to draft the
following: “A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.”4
1. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur,
[1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63/1953.
2. Id. at 90.
3. Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
4. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its
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Now, you are confronted with various difficult, but sensible,
questions. How do you define such a “peremptory norm?” What
are the mechanisms by which a norm attains peremptory status?
What theoretical or practical criteria must be met? Finally, are
such norms peremptory because they are inviolably integral to
the concept of “international morality,” or are they peremptory
because (all) states have consented? The answers are not so
clear, and the ILC concludes that “[t]here is not as yet any
generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule
of international law as having the character of jus cogens.”5
Lacking principled criteria by which to identify jus cogens
norms, you and the ILC decide to punt the determination,
deferring to future state practice and international
jurisprudence to fill in the content of and draw the outlines
around such norms. To quote the ILC,
[I]nternational law is at a stage of rapid development . . .
the prudent course seems to be to state in general terms
the rule that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a rule of
jus cogens and to leave the full content of this rule to be
worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of
international tribunals.6
Finalized as Article 53 of the VCLT, the provision thus reads:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.7
At this moment, two developments occur simultaneously: (i) the
concept of jus cogens is formally recognized by an authoritative
Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
169, 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
5. Sir Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Law
of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 36, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add.
1–3 [hereinafter Second Report on the Law of Treaties].
6. Id. at 53 (citation omitted).
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
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international legal body; and (ii) that authoritative legal body
abdicates its role in determining the substance of those norms.
Thus, the concept of jus cogens remains undefined. However,
by remaining undefined, jus cogens is unable to bind
international actors. This is because all binding law must issue
from and with binding authority; merely gesturing in all-ornothing vocabulary to jus cogens (as a norm “accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a
whole . . . from which no derogation is permitted”8) is
insufficient. Because it did not determine the source of jus
cogens’ authority or identify the scope of the norms issuing from
that authority, the ILC, as a simple practical matter,
inadvertently but effectively crippled lawmakers’ and jurists’
ability to invoke jus cogens in creating and limiting legal
entitlements.
This is true for various reasons, which I will explore in this
Article. In Part II, I begin by pointing out that the concept of jus
cogens, while not an entirely novel one in the 1950s, did not gain
widespread traction in international legal discourse until that
time.9 This period was rife with legal and historical flux. Largely
due to the atrocities confronted during the recently-concluded
Second World War, the international legal community found
itself gravitating towards various affirmations of “fundamental”
rights—all expressed in the uncompromising vocabulary of the
universal.10 The concept of jus cogens was no different,
articulated in absolutist language that was in tension with its
dependence—for its very content—on state practice and
undeveloped international jurisprudence. In effect, its
vocabulary denied its relationship to recent historical events.
Does this indicate an irreconcilable rift between the
fundamentalism of substantive jus cogens language and the
historical specificity of its acceptance by the international
community?
In Part III, I point out the unfortunate, somewhat inevitable
circularity of sourcing such norms among the moving targets of
international custom and state practice. The concept of total
non-derogability begins to look incompatible with a custom8. Id. art. 53 (citation omitted).
9. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 334–35 (2009) (tracing the historical
development of peremptory norms).
10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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based understanding of the evolution and legitimacy of
international law. Without static sources of binding law, the
traditional, state-centric model of international law draws
nearly all of its authority from state practice, which is constantly
evolving. And as with such customary norms, the reality is that
states can and do derogate from peremptory norms—especially
when jus cogens norms threaten to chip away at states’ (and
courts’) understanding of sovereignty as inviolable.11
Part IV discusses the “false universalism” suffered by nonderogable rights. Because the theory and rhetoric of jus cogens
leave no room to acknowledge its own contingency, the debate
around jus cogens threatens to devolve into a hegemonic struggle
between special interests—all expressed in the language of the
universal. The inflexibility so crucial to the concept of jus cogens
makes effecting concrete legal entitlements (especially ones that
potentially curtail state sovereignty) practically impossible.
Here, I contrast to traditional treaties, which reflect negotiation,
compromise, and few absolutes—but actually bind state
behavior. The cost of committing to jus cogens, however, is
simply too high: no state will agree to bind itself to an inflexible
set of universal principles vulnerable to manipulation, open to
interpretation, and whose basic scope is yet to be determined by
the practice of other states. Jus cogens cannot be both abstract
and concrete; the attempt to do so risks the sort of inadvertent
irrelevance that only the most well-intentioned, abstract ideals
can achieve.
Part V offers a few suggestions to recapture the relevance of
jus cogens norms—by lifting its fundamentalist burden. As a
start, it may be useful to re-conceptualize jus cogens as
originating in the rights of people, delinked from statehood or
jurisdiction. But more importantly, jus cogens’ main obstacle to
relevance, I argue, is its own absolute inflexibility. That
narrative can be changed. Stripped of its mandatory, all-ornothing vocabulary, jus cogens norms should pose less of a threat
to state sovereignty and, paradoxically, stand a greater chance
of effecting concrete behavioral change among international
actors. For, as with traditional treaties, states could presumably
more easily bind themselves to uphold jus cogens norms if their
commitments were context-bound, rather than toothlessly
11. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and
Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (1996) [hereinafter
Bassiouni, International Crimes]; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity
in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 419, 431 (1983).
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atemporal and universal. Characterized in this more modest and
concrete way, the cost of committing to jus cogens norms is
drastically lowered—and jus cogens may stand a chance of
remaining relevant in an international legal landscape that
shows little sign of moving away from a consent-based model.
Finally, I conclude by arguing that the ILC’s decades-long,
not entirely unsuccessful attempt to weave jus cogens norms into
the fabric of international jurisprudence need not become
irrelevant. Progress can be achieved by looking to—and
committing to—a more concrete and more flexible narrative for
jus cogens norms. Today, there is nothing mandating jus cogens’
symbolic absolutism (if there ever was). It is time we remove that
weight, however laudable it is.
II. THE HISTORICAL VOCABULARY OF JUS COGENS
A. IN THEORY, UNIVERSAL
As understood today, the term “jus cogens” refers to certain
overriding, peremptory norms that states cannot opt out of, by
contract or in practice.12 These are norms “at the summit (elite
norms, as it were) of enhanced normativity—’highest ranking’
norms, worth a ‘quality label’,” which rank above the norms
“below them, the great mass of merely binding norms, which the
International Law Commission eloquently styles ‘ordinary
customary or conventional rules.’”13 This idea—that some legal
principles are inherently normatively superior to others—was
introduced as early as the seventeenth century.14 However, the
concept did not gain meaningful jurisprudential traction until
after World War II (and to a non-negligible degree, as a result of
that war).15
In 1945, the newly-ratified United Nations Charter
(“Charter”) expressed the United Nations’ determination “to

12. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 331–32.
13. Weil, supra note 11, at 424 (quoting Charles De Visscher, Positivisme
et “Jus Cogens,” 75 REV. GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUBLIC 5, 9 (1971))
(alteration in original); Paul De Visscher, Cours Général De Droit International
Public, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 107 (1972); Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-eighth Session, [1976] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n, pt. 2, 1, 92, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.4/1976/Add.1 (Part 2)) [hereinafter
Report of the International Law Commission].
14. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 334–35.
15. Id. at 336.
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save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”16
In doing so, the Charter repeatedly invoked the idea of
“fundamental freedoms.”17 For instance, the intention was
expressed to: “[r]eaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women and of nations large and small;”18 “[a]chieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion”;19 and to promote “universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”20
Complements to the Charter—and specifically, to this language
in the Charter—UDHR, ICCPR, and other human rights treaties
emerged shortly after the Charter was ratified. In 1948, for
example, as a direct “result of the experience of the Second World
War,” and with the birth of the UN, “the international
community vowed never again to allow atrocities like those of
[WWII] happen again.”21 Accordingly, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (“UDHR”) was adopted, which “set[] out, for
the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally
protected.”22 In like fashion, in 1966 both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted
as well.23 Along with various other affirmations of
“fundamental” rights, these guarantees were intended to

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

U.N. Charter prmbl.
Id. art. 1, ¶ 3; art. 55.
Id. prmbl.
Id. art. 1, ¶ 3.
Id. art. 55.
History of the Document: Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/historydocument/index.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2016) [hereinafter History of the
Document].
22. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited Aug.
14, 2016).
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Treaty Doc.
No.95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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“complement the UN Charter with a road map to guarantee the
rights of every individual everywhere.”24
Running parallel to these developments were the first
meaningful murmurs of peremptory norms among legal
scholars. On the eve of World War II, Alfred von Verdross posited
that there had come to exist in international law certain
compulsory norms, which forbade treaties that “are obviously in
contradiction to the ethics of a certain community.”25 At the
time, the issue whether such norms trumped state consent had
not yet been fully confronted,26 but the post-World War II
landscape cemented at least some international jurists’
conviction that they should. For instance, in its 1951 Advisory
Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
explained that “underlying the [Genocide] Convention are
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding
on States, even without any conventional obligation.”27 In this
manner, the Court explained, the Genocide Convention was
“intended by the . . . contracting parties to be definitely
universal in scope.”28
The thread running through and uniting these
developments is the understanding that all states would—and
should—be bound by peremptory norms. The language used by
proponents of such norms references the absolute, inflexible, and
fundamental, and invokes their universality: these norms reflect
“overriding principles of international law” and “constitut[e]
principles of international public policy . . . expressive of rules of
international morality so cogent that an international tribunal
would consider them forming a part of those principles of law
generally recognized by civilized nations.”29 If “overriding,” then
such norms logically are superior to the will of any state who
would disagree: “[c]lose to the heart of the concept lurks the
embryonic notion of a world public order not exclusively
controlled by nation-states, one that is foundational, guarding

24. History of the Document, supra note 21.
25. Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM.
J. INT’L L. 571, 572 (1937).
26. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 335–36.
27. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 23 (May 28).
28. Id.
29. Lauterpacht, supra note 1, at 155.
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the most fundamental and highly-valued interests of
international society.”30 Such norms, presumably by definition,
are “binding on States, even without any conventional
obligations.”31 This is the most natural interpretation of jus
cogens norms.
B. IN PRACTICE, A RETREAT TO STATE CONSENT
As finalized, the language of Article 53 of the VCLT retreats
from the original conception of jus cogens as superior to state
will. Article 53 expresses a conception of peremptory norms as
explicitly sourced in state consent:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.32
Incorporating state consent introduces several difficult
logical knots, which jurists have not yet been able to unwind. For
instance, philosophically speaking, this formulation is a curious
combination of the natural law tradition that jus cogens norms
fit most easily within—where such norms are universal simply
due to their inherent, inviolate moral authority33—and the
30. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental
to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587 (1988).
31. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, supra note 27.
32. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53.
33. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 683rd Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 60, 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (one ILC member argued that
peremptory norms could be identified on substance alone, for instance, whether
they were “deeply rooted in the international conscience”); Karen Parker & Lyn
Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419 (1989). A. Mark Weisburd offers a useful critique of
the natural law approach to conceptualizing jus cogens: “[S]uch an approach,
exemplified by Verdross’ reliance on ‘the ethics of a particular community’ as a
source of jus cogens rules, risks falling into the error of assuming that, if it would
be a good thing for subjects of a legal system to refrain from particular behavior,
it must make sense to render the behavior illegal. This does not, however,
follow. If the behavior is rendered illegal, it will become necessary to determine
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positivist tradition, in which peremptory norms are binding
because they reflect state acceptance and consent (as evidenced,
for instance, in treaties and opinio juris).34
As a matter of language, there are various tensions created
by defining a peremptory norm as one “accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted,” but simultaneously
“which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.”35 For instance, if
to attain peremptory status, a norm must be recognized by the
“whole” of the international community, does that confer an
absolute right of veto on any single state dissenter?36 Is it rule
by numbers, where a majority of states could override any such
dissenter?37 Can a state that never consented to such a regime
be held accountable for a perceived derogation? Interestingly,
the ILC has answered a version of these questions: it has
explained that recognition by “the international community as a
whole . . . certainly does not mean the requirement of
unanimous recognition by all the members of that community,
which would give each State an inconceivable right of veto.”38
Instead, the ILC clarified, what is necessary is recognition “not
only by some particular group of States, even if it constitutes a
majority, but by all the essential components of the international
community.”39 But this is still unsatisfactory. Who or what forms
the “essential components of the international community?”
The definition of peremptory norms in Article 53 unravels
further when one considers that such norms “can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character.”40 If so, that means peremptory norms can
be modified only by, essentially, another peremptory norm (one
having the “same character”). Does that mean all states must in
how to deal with subjects of the legal system who engage in the behavior
anyway.” A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as
Illustrated by the War In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (1995)
(quoting Verdross, supra note 25, at 576).
34. See Parker & Neylon, supra note 33, at 422.
35. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53.
36. For a further exploration of this issue, see Weil, supra note 11, at 426.
37. See, e.g., Andreas L. Paulus, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and
Fragmentation, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 297, 308 (2005) (discussing the viability
of persistent objection as a means of avoiding the binding force of jus cogens
norms).
38. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, at 119.
39. Id.
40. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53.
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unison essentially agree to derogate from the original, nonderogable norm to create a new, non-derogable norm? That is,
without universal derogation, no norm could displace a
peremptory norm, because any deviation would amount to a
derogation and be invalid.41
There is essentially no guidance on the process by which a
conventional norm attains “supernorm” or “superlaw” status—
or what the consequences of attaining such status might be.42
For instance, how does one reconcile the idea that certain norms
could “subsequently” take on the nature of a jus cogens norm—
if jus cogens norms were always fundamental and are
expressions of a priori “overriding principles of international
law?”43 A peremptory norm would seem by definition atemporal;
there should be no “subsequent” or “precedent” involved. As
another example, if certain norms are so fundamental that
states may be bound without having explicitly consented, then
the concept of state sovereignty begins to show some cracks. But

41. This contradiction has created much debate among legal scholars. See
Weisburd, supra note 33, at 35 (arguing that for jus cogens as formulated under
Article 53, “there is no higher authority in international law than the consensus
of states.” This means that “it is a contradiction in terms to refer to jus cogens
as controlling customary international law. This follows, since to assert that jus
cogens controls customary international law is to assert that changes in the
general practice of states cannot affect the legal status of those rules of
customary international law of jus cogens status. But such a development is
logically impossible with respect to Article 53 jus cogens, since it would require
that a rule which ex hypothesi did not represent the general practice of states
was nonetheless ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole.’”).
42. Weil has more fully explored the differing “tiers” of norms created by
the concept of jus cogens. See Weil, supra note 11, at 428 (“With normativity
split into rules on several tiers, it has now become necessary to distinguish,
within each codifying convention, among the purely conventional rules, the
ordinary rules of general international law, and the peremptory rules of general
international law. This raises, inter alia, the problem of derogation through
particular agreements from the provisions of such conventions and the problem
of reservations. The recent Convention on the Law of the Sea will certainly give
rise to difficulties of this kind. One may similarly ask with regard to the
provisions on jus cogens in Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties: are they purely conventional rules that are binding solely on
states parties to the Convention? Are they ordinary rules of customary law, so
that states may derogate from them by particular agreements—which would be
a denial of the very concept of peremptory norms? Or are they themselves the
expression of norms of jus cogens, so that no state is entitled to reject the concept
of peremptory norms?”).
43. Lauterpacht, supra note 1 at 154–55.
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without a robust model of state sovereignty, the consent-based
foundation of international law starts to look similarly wobbly.44
Of course, Article 53 does not abandon the concept of state
consent: a peremptory norm is one that is “accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a
whole . . . .”45 A circularity begins to emerge: how can universal
acceptance be the metric by which the legitimacy of a jus cogens
norm is measured so long as those very norms are still in flux?46
As the ILC admitted, they intended to “leave the full content of
[jus cogens] to be worked out in State practice and in the
jurisprudence of international tribunals.”47 However, if their
fundamental nature is taken at face value, peremptory norms
have never not been peremptory; they are by definition
immutable. But the circle continues: if immutable, why did their
widespread recognition take place as late as the mid-twentieth
century?
Despite this theoretical confusion, there are some norms
that are widely considered peremptory: prohibitions against
grave breaches of humanitarian law (aggression, genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, slavery, and torture),48
prohibitions against the use of force against another state, pacta
sunt servanda, domaine réservé, a state’s right to enter into
44. More broadly speaking, in international law, norms are as a general
matter defined by and given teeth through treaties, state practice, and
customary law. In other words, to determine the type of event covered by any
given norm—and the repercussions for violating that norm—one must look
towards the agreements between states, as well as those states’ practices. See,
e.g., Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy
of Norms in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 583, 583–84 (1997).
45. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53.
46. For instance, “the customary prohibition against genocide stemmed
from the recognition of human rights as a substantive aim of international law
after World War II.” Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L
L. 757, 784–85 (2001).
47. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, at 53.
48. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 68. He sources these
in: “(1) international pronouncements, or what can be called international
opinio juris, reflecting the recognition that these crimes are deemed part of
general customary law; (2) language in preambles or other provisions of treaties
applicable to these crimes which indicates these crimes’ higher status in
international law; (3) the large number of states which have ratified treaties
related to these crimes; and (4) the ad hoc international investigations and
prosecutions of perpetrators of these crimes”; Weisburd, supra note 33; see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987); see also Weisburd, supra note 33, at 27–29; (discussing genocide as a
peremptory norm).
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treaties.49 As I will discuss later, however, the contradictions
found in Article 53 are not merely of theoretical consequence—
they remain extremely relevant as states and courts seek to
parse through disputes created by conflicts over even these
“accepted” norms with jus cogens status.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENCY

A. AUTHORSHIP
As formulated, the concept of jus cogens norms suffers from
a severe definitional and authoritative vacuum. Jus cogens
norms exist—and are non-derogable—if states act like they are,
but states (presumably) will only do so if jus cogens norms a
priori exist. Nowhere in that formulation does any unitary
authority play a role in determining what norms qualify, when
jus cogens status has been attained, or how to translate such
norms into concrete legal rights and duties. Indeed, as the ILC
expressly stated,
[I]nternational law is at a stage of rapid development . . .
the prudent course seems to be to state in general terms
the rule that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a rule of
jus cogens and to leave the full content of this rule to be
worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of
international tribunals.50
States, international courts, and tribunals have effectively
been saddled with the task of acting as legislatures as well as
adjudicators for jus cogens norms: “leav[ing] everything to be
worked out in state practice and by the jurisprudence of
international tribunals,” “where there is no tribunal having
jurisdiction,” then “the interested state . . . is made not only the
judge but also the legislator in its own cause.”51 It can even be
said that this “amounts to a complete abdication of the
legislative function.”52 As Lee M. Caplan put it, “allowing the
courts to determine the parameters of jus cogens through
49. See Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as
Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM J. INT’L L. 946, 965
(1967).
50. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, at 53.
51. Schwelb, supra note 49, at 964.
52. Id.
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application of the normative hierarchy theory may undermine
the principle of separation of powers, in some cases
inappropriately transferring foreign-policymaking power from
the political branches of government to the judiciary.”53
Without a legislature (or with only one ill-equipped to
legislate), there can be no effective author of law. It is therefore
entirely unsurprising that states, international courts, and
international policymakers have struggled for more than a halfcentury to flesh out the substance of a jus cogens norm—with
varying amounts of confusion.54 Without an author, there can be
at most only a diffusion of authority that, because it is drawn
from the heterogeneous activity of independent sovereign states,
creates enormous inconsistency in the task of delineating jus
cogens norms.
Nor does the common—but misplaced—attempt to personify
any such “international community of states” adequately place
authorship in that entirely vague “community.”55 As seductive
as attempting to so personify might be, the foundations of
international law—as I discuss in the next section—are simply
far too rooted in state consent, and any such “community”
remains “impossible to identify separately from its members.”56
For the same reason, there is a deep reluctance to grant any
international organization or group of states, pluralistic or
53. Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 773 (2003).
54. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 346.
55. For a fuller discussion of this “tendency to vague personification,” see
Weil, supra note 11, at 426. Weil points to the “various telltale signs of a
tendency to vague personification of the international community. The
international community ‘accepts and recognizes’ the ascent of an ordinary
norm to the rank of peremptory norm. It ‘recognizes’ that an international
obligation is essential to the protection of its ‘fundamental interest,’ which
seems to imply that the community as such possesses such interests. The
International Court of Justice considers that a state has obligations to the
international community and can enter into commitments towards it; one
Member of the Court has even spoken of rules of law that are the ‘common
property of the international community.’ Perhaps this community may be
viewed as identical to the ‘mankind’ whose ‘common heritage’ or ‘province’ is
nowadays considered to be the use of outer space, the moon, and the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. However, for want of adequate
organic representation, this community seems impossible to identify separately
from its members; but those members—and here the International Law
Commission has been quite unequivocal—can only be states, to the exclusion
even of international organizations, which the Commission regards as simply
‘the creation of those States.’ In brief, the international community means
states. But all states, or merely some, and, if so, which?”
56. Id.
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otherwise, the authority to determine the substance and scope
of peremptory norms. Whoever attempts to wield such authority
purports to bind the entire globe to action or inaction. But
without such authority, how can the international community
identify in binding fashion so-called peremptory norms?
B. AUTHORITY VACUUM
This confusion is hardly surprising. International law has
long been plagued by this sort of authority vacuum.57 As H.L.A.
Hart famously argued, the rules of international law “constitute
not a system but a simple set.”58 True or not, this statement
continues to embody the main criticism of international law—
that it comprises laws, customs, and rules binding only because
states have accepted them as such, rather than laws, customs,
and rules binding because they are inherently valid or should
be.59
Under this formulation, the international legal landscape is
a pluralistic, decentralized one, built upon the voluntary consent
of states.60 Those states’ independence and sovereignty thus
form perhaps the most important aspects of international law.
As the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCJ”)
explained, states are the independent subjects of international

57. Id. at 414 (noting the following weaknesses of the international
normative system: “not only the inadequacy of its sanction mechanisms, but
also the mediocrity of many of its norms. In regard to certain points,
international law knows no norm at all, but a lacuna. As for others, the
substance of the rule is still too controversial for it effectively to govern the
conduct of states. On yet other points, the norm has remained at the stage of
abstract general standards on which only the-necessarily slow-development of
international law can confer concrete substance and precise meaning.”).
58. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 229 (1961).
59. See Weil, supra note 11, at 413–418 (describing the structural and
conceptual weaknesses of the international normative system).
60. See Christenson, supra note 30, at 588 (“Despite considerable
theorizing otherwise, States almost exclusively constitute the present
international order.”); Salcedo, supra note 44, at 583 (“States are
simultaneously the creators and subjects of [international law’s] norms; as sole
authority on the laws they formulate, states themselves assess their meaning
and scope. It is thus the individual states that interpret the obligations to which
they—like their partners, the other states—are subject. Finally, it is they who
decide as to the legality of their own conduct or that of third parties towards
them. Hence the fragmentary nature of international law, and its relativism,
the consequence of the equal nature and poorly institutionalized structure of
international society.”).
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law, and any law binding them must “emanate from their own
free will”:
International
law
governs
relations
between
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed
in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to
regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.61
This conception confirms a few deeply-rooted tenets of
international law: states are the subjects of and actors under
international law (as opposed to the citizens that reside in those
states); states are imbued with sovereignty that is virtually
inviolable; obligations are legally binding on sovereign states
only if they agree, and any law purporting to bind states cannot
do so if it would infringe upon that state’s sovereignty.62 In this
vein, according to the PCJ, the “first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”63
This state-centric model of international law arguably gives
rise to a corresponding normative deference to a state’s own
interpretation of its obligations under international law, or more
specifically, its obligations to carry out the aspects of
international law that it has expressly consented to (by treaty or
otherwise).64 An interpretive pluralism—wholly at odds with the
concept of jus cogens—then arises from the international

61. S.S.”Lotus,” Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
62. See, e.g., Salcedo, supra note 44, at 583–84 (explaining that
“international society is essentially a society of sovereign, independent states.
Despite the great transformations which international organizations have
brought about in the structure of international society, political power is still
individually distributed among its members, and international law continues to
be an eminently decentralized, little institutionalized, legal system. It is for this
reason that in international law, states are both the legislators and the subjects
of rules; consent by states is thus logically the keystone in the process of
creating international legal rules.”).
63. S.S.”Lotus,” 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18.
64. See, e.g., Salcedo, supra note 44, at 583–84.
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community’s lack of a hegemonic sovereign to act as a “single
source of normative validity.”65
International law, in other words, traditionally operates as
the law of the contingent—contingent on state consent—
evidenced through practice, formalized agreement, and
jurisprudential expression. International law’s authority derives
from the very signs of its existence—in treaty, in state practice,
in opinio juris. Even more problematically for jus cogens, this
kind of law is constantly evolving, dependent on the complex
motivations that drive states in their various roles: as
legislators, interpreters, adjudicators and enforcers of
international law. In that model,
[E]very breach of a customary law contains the seed for
a new legality. In one sense, the action is a breach
because the state is judged as a subject of international
law; in another sense, the action is a seed for a new law
because the state acts as a legislator of international
law.66
Jus cogens norms, on the other hand, seek to affect a shift
in the standing international legal framework: to bind states
because such norms are supposedly not contingent; they are
theoretically accepted by the international community of states
“as a whole” because their normative validity exists ex ante to
formalization in treaties or the like. But this proposition is
extremely difficult to reconcile with the current international
order, where, even as some principles may attain primacy, they
do not do so without referencing state consent.67 As Gordon A.
Christenson has noted, “[w]hile some of these interests might
become overriding community policies thought fundamental,
they are still perceived as part of the basic legal order of the
nation-state system.”68
There is an unavoidable tension between universalism and
contingency, between language that binds all, and practice that
65. Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International
Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 558 (2002).
66. Roberts, supra note 46, at 784–85.
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 n.6 (1987) (noting that jus cogens “is now widely
accepted . . . as a principle of customary international law (albeit of higher
status)” and that “[a]lthough the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its
content is not agreed”) (emphasis added).
68. Christenson, supra note 30, at 588–89.
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looks to, well, practice. This special kind of tension—the tension
of an authoritative, normative struggle—finds itself further
complicated in the jurisprudence of international courts and
tribunals.
C. PRIMACY OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
When it comes to adjudicating jus cogens-related rights in
the context of specific legal disputes, there are no satisfactory
answers to the questions that logically issue. For instance, who
suffers injury when a peremptory norm is breached? Does
universal jurisdiction attach? What about universal standing?
Are states bound by a universal duty to prosecute? Where do
states’ obligations logically begin and end? 69
On the subject of obligations erga omnes, M. Cherif
Bassiouni has argued that
[R]ecognizing certain international crimes as jus cogens
carries with it the duty to prosecute or extradite, the nonapplicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes, and
universality of jurisdiction over such crimes irrespective
of where they were committed, by whom (including
Heads of State), against what category of victims, and
irrespective of the context of their occurrence (peace or
war).70
That is, “characterization of certain crimes as jus cogens places
upon states the obligatio erga omnes not to grant impunity to the
violators of such crimes.”71 Unfortunately, it would hardly be
controversial to state at this point that essentially no such
obligations have consistently managed to attach among states in
the international community.72
69. See Weil, supra note 11, at 430.
70. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 66.
71. Id.
72. See id. (“The practice of the states evidences that, more often than not,
impunity has been allowed for jus cogens crimes, the theory of universality has
been far from being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to
prosecute or extradite is more inchoate than established, other than when it
arises out of specific treaty obligations.”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for
Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9, 10–11 (1996) (noting that despite the extremely high level of
victimization and hundreds of millions of deaths in the twentieth century, the
number of prosecutions remains disproportionately low) [hereinafter Bassiouni,
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Jus cogens norms, broadly speaking, have been incorporated
in the international legal jurisprudence in very spotty fashion.
On the one hand, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (“IACHR”) has described jus cogens norms as part of a
“superior order of legal norms, which the laws of man or nations
may not contravene,”73 sourced from “the essential dignity of the
individual.”74 And Judge Lauterpacht, in his separate opinion in
the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and Montenegro), thought that jus cogens norms could
perhaps be superior to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter
and Security Council actions.75 On the other hand, the ICJ has
often chosen instead to rely on the concept of “obligations erga
omnes.”76 In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ identified
“obligations erga omnes” as those “obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole.”77 These “by their very
nature [] are the concern of all States”: because of “the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.”78 The Court drew “an essential distinction” between
Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice].
73. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 49 (2003).
74. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants,
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 95–96 (Sept.
17, 2003).
75. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 408,
440 (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.).
76. See Paulus, supra note 37, at 307 (collecting cases).
77. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd., Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3,
33 (Feb. 5).
78. Id. The Court went on to note: “[s]uch obligations derive, for example,
in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression,
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into
the body of general international law . . . others are conferred by international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.”
The ILC has interpreted this to meant that “there are in fact a number,
albeit a small one, of international obligations which, by reason of the
importance of their subject-matter for the international community as a whole,
are—unlike the others—obligations in whose fulfillment all States have a legal
interest”; thus the “responsibility engaged by the breach of these obligations is
engaged not only in regard to the State which was the direct victim of the
breach: it is also engaged in regard to all the other members of the international
community, so that, in the event of a breach of these obligations, every State
must be considered justified in invoking—probably through judicial channels—

480

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2

such obligations “and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection.”79 The ICJ has also pointed to
intransgressible principles as “elementary considerations of
humanity.”80
However, even as courts may theoretically endorse the
concept of jus cogens (or concepts like it, such as obligations erga
omnes), difficulties arise when courts are faced with the actual
application of such norms to the rights of parties in resolving a
concrete dispute. This is especially true because upholding jus
cogens norms often appears to come at a high price: that of
chipping away at accepted notions of state sovereignty—which
courts, not unreasonably, have proven especially reluctant to
do.81 For instance, in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, it grappled with the
difficulty in balancing a state’s right to self-defense with the
individual’s (and the environment’s) right to protection from
nuclear evisceration.82 In the separate opinion of Judge Dugard
in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Judge Dugard
applauded the ICJ’s determination that a reservation to the
ICJ’s jurisdiction cannot be invalidated solely because it relates
to a jus cogens norm, such as genocide.83 This is because, notably,
the Court’s jurisdiction is based on consent, and “no peremptory
norm requires States to consent to jurisdiction where the
compliance with a peremptory norm is the issue before the
Court”—the principle of consent cannot be “overthrow[n].”84
In this fashion, tenets of jurisdiction and immunity are the
most common principles courts have relied on in drawing
conceptual limitations around jus cogens norms. For instance, in
2001, in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, the European Court of
the responsibility of the State committing the internationally wrongful act.”
Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, at 99.
79. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 33.
80. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 112 (June 27).
81. See Weisburd, supra note 33, at 26 (“To the extent that enforcing a jus
cogens rule against a particular state does significant harm to that state, the
calculus of costs to international society is different from the corresponding
domestic situation. If a state is weakened by application of a jus cogens rule, the
consequences may spill over and affect other states.”).
82. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
83. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court
and Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment,
2006 I.C.J. 86, 87 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Dugard, J.).
84. Id. at 87, 91.
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Human Rights (“ECHR”) held that jus cogens violations cannot
strip sovereign immunity from a state.85 In 2002, the ICJ
similarly upheld immunity to have been infringed by an arrest
warrant respecting alleged crimes against humanity.86 A decade
later, in 2012, the ICJ affirmed the principle of immunity as
deriving from the sovereign equality of states, one of the
“fundamental principles of the international legal order,” and
emphasized the procedural nature of immunity, making it
“entirely distinct from the substantive law which determines
whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful.”87 The ICJ
essentially concluded that “state practice does not support the
existence of a specific jus cogens exception to the jurisdictional
immunity of states.”88
National courts have varied widely in their application of
jus cogens norms (indeed, in their application of international
law more broadly), but there is a general skepticism when it
comes to the propriety of anything invading a domestic
sovereign’s right to create law governing its territory, even if
that invasion is one of an international supernorm that the
sovereign purportedly has by definition consented to.89 In some
cases, however, international precepts of jus cogens have been
invoked to delegitimize aspects of domestic law found to be in
violation of jus cogens norms.90 In Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), the
British House of Lords emphasized the limits of immunity with
respect to gross human rights violations by State officials.91 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) has explained that “in spite of possible national
authorisation [sic] by legislative or judicial bodies to violate the
85. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 19, ¶ 61 (2001).
86. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 30, ¶ 71 (Feb. 14).
87. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 98, ¶¶ 57–58 (Feb. 3).
88. See Ronald J. Bettauer, Germany Sues Italy at the International Court
of Justice on Foreign Sovereign Immunity – Legal Underpinnings and
Implications for U.S. Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW (Nov. 19, 2009),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13/issue/22/germany-sues-italyinternational-court-justice-foreign-sovereign.
89. See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 37, at 321.
90. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of
Judge Mumba, ¶¶ 155–56 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10
1998).
91. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others,
Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] AC 1 (H.L.) 147 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
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principle banning torture, individuals remain bound to comply
with that principle.”92
Ultimately, even as international courts may ideally
“represent the primacy of abstract humanitarianism over
diplomatic technique [and] morally oriented retributivism over
the subtle techniques of public law,”93 this “primacy” has been
less than completely adhered to in the decisions of these courts.
If anything, only the “primacy” of state sovereignty has been
confirmed. As evidenced, there is not a tremendous amount of
consistency throughout the jurisprudence.94 The one exception
may be the tendency of courts to reference the signs of state
consent,95 and consequently to flesh out the normative outlines
of jus cogens extremely carefully in light of the dominant, statecentric model of international law. That is, international courts
and tribunals are generally (and not unreasonably) reluctant to
impose on states binding and concrete obligations in potential
curtailment of their sovereignty.
D. UNIVERSAL AND CONTINGENT
The absolutist, fundamental vocabulary of jus cogens denies
its own contingency, its perennial search for authorship, and
finally, the limitations imposed by a consent-based model of
international law. But this is a false denial—the complex
interaction between jus cogens and state consent cannot be
ignored. As Martti Koskenniemi has put it, “‘[u]niversal values’
or ‘the international community’ can only make themselves

92. Furundzija, IT-95-17 at ¶ 155.
93. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 65, at 577.
94. See Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal
Order, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 233, 247 (2010) (Petsche divides the
jurisprudence into three categories: “[t]he first category includes those cases in
which a court or tribunal refers, often in an obiter dictum, to a specific rule as
being a jus cogens rule, without any direct effect on the actual outcome. The
second group of decisions includes those cases in which the alleged jus cogens
character of a norm is relied upon to seek a result different from a holding of
invalidity of a treaty. The third category, which is directly relevant for the
present analysis, comprises the very few cases where the validity of a treaty, or
a treaty provision, is challenged on the grounds of an alleged jus cogens
violation.”).
95. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1995) (“If we accept treaties and custom as sources of
the law, this is precisely because they represent, as it were, the external face of
international social facts. They provide the jurists with a special technique for
grasping what, in the hard reality of social life, emerges as norms.”).
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known through mediation by a State, an organization [sic], or a
political movement.”96
Even the conception of a more ‘modern,’ hybrid rise to
legitimacy for norms such as jus cogens cannot untether itself
from the will of states or other such independent international
actors. Such a process, some have argued, would be deductive,
“begin[ing] with general statements of rules rather than
particular instances of practice,” whereby multilateral treaties
and declarations by international organs (the United Nations,
for instance) can more quickly launch widespread recognition of
declarative customs that are confirmed by state practice.97 But
again, the legitimizing anchor remains state practice: the
fictionalized, pluralistic unity of state consent remains the final
arbiter of the scope of international norms.
Judge Bedjaoui at the ICJ has endorsed the replacement of
a “resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international
law” with “a law more readily seeking to reflect a collective
juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of
States organized as a community.”98 However, even that
“collective juridical conscience” is still comprised of “States
organized as a community.” A similar problem frustrates the
sometimes-proffered conception of international law as formed
around a set of constitutional principles that are hierarchically
superior to principles merely reflective of the political will of
states (which are subject to this hierarchy), in analogy to many
domestic legal systems.99 It is difficult to conceive of such a
model existing independent of state consent, or at the least, some
rise among states of a hegemon sitting at the top of the
(normative) hierarchy.
Prosper Weil’s position in 1983 still resonates today:
“international society remains at bottom a society of
juxtaposition, founded on the ‘sovereign equality of States.’”100
96. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A
Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197, 199 (2004) [hereinafter
International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration].
97. Roberts, supra note 46, at 758; see also Bruno Simma & Philip Alston,
The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General
Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89-90 (1988-89).
98. Threat or Use of Force by Nuclear Weapons, Declaration of Mohammed
Bedjaoui, 1996 I.C.J. 268, ¶ 13 (July 8) (declaration of Mohammed Bedjaoui).
99. See, e.g., Stefan Kirchner, Relative Normativity and the Constitutional
Dimension of International Law: A Place for Values in the International Legal
System?, 5 GERMAN L.J. 47, 57 (2004).
100. Weil, supra note 11, at 419 (quoting Annex to UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV)
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This creates a “fundamental intellectual confusion” for jus
cogens norms: they are “derived from rules limiting the freedom
of subjects of law in legal systems in which the authority to
determine such rules is undisputed; the subjects of law cannot
escape the courts’ control; these subjects have in any case
considerable incentive to submit themselves to the rules applied
by the courts; and the negative social consequences of compelling
any single subject of the law to conform to public policy rules will
almost always be modest. The concept is to be applied, however,
in an international system in which none of those circumstances
are present.”101
The reality is that states, courts and tribunals have
demonstrated great reluctance to move away from the
entrenched consent-based model of international law—where
there is little space for jus cogens norms to take root—to one that
allows universal norms to operate as binding law and confer
rights on parties in a legal dispute or otherwise. Nor does it seem
likely that such reluctance will diminish anytime soon. Thus, as
discussed in the next part, it may behoove the international
community to focus instead on addressing a preceding issue: the
rhetoric of jus cogens.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF RHETORIC

A. PRIMACY OF INTERPRETATION
Today, to put it mildly, “[t]he gap between legal expectations
and legal reality is [] quite wide.”102 Rights only matter if they
actually effect change in individual entitlements and behavior,
and there are serious difficulties in matching discrete
entitlements and remedies to “jus cogens” rights, conceptualized
as they are in such broad and absolute terms. For, as discussed,
as currently formulated jus cogens norms suffer from various
inherent tensions: a definitional vacuum; jurisprudential
application that veers uneasily between universal sources of
authority and those rooted in state consent; and a less than ideal
rhetorical inflexibility that only papers over these tensions
without resolving any of them.

(1970), reprinted in 65 AJIL 243 (1971), 9 ILM 1292 (1970)).
101. Weisburd, supra note 33, at 27.
102. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 66.
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At the highest levels, jus cogens norms seek to shift the
paradigm of international rights—especially in relation to
entrenched notions of state sovereignty.103 The problem is that
jus cogens, because it seeks to create a kind of superlegal
supernorm, denies the relevance of authorship and its attendant
political and rhetorical realities—that is, it denies the “strategic
choices that are opened by particular vocabularies of global
governance.”104 For instance, even Bassiouni’s bold, seemingly
categorical statement, that jus cogens consists of “certain crimes
[that] affect the interests of the world community as a whole
because they threaten the peace and security of humankind and
because they shock the conscience of humanity,”105 is still
contingent on the existence of an international, state-driven
agreement as to what “threaten[s] the peace and security of
humankind,” and what “shock[s] the conscience of humanity.”106
Thus, even Bassiouni has acknowledged that “jus cogens leaves
open differences of values, philosophies, goals, and strategies of
those who claim the existence of the norm in a given situation
and its applicability to a given legal issue.”107 To quote Oliver
Gerstenberg, “concepts such as jus cogens are interpretive
concepts, i.e. concepts that are constitutively part of a global
transjurisdictionally-led debate about the sources of
international law—concepts that permit, indeed, invite, deep,
sharp and pervasive reasonable disagreement among
interpreters over their meaning and scope.”108
Definitions and interpretations are excruciatingly
important, and jus cogens cannot seek to source its authority in
the disparate will of the states while simultaneously denying

103. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Reality of the Law of Nations, in 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF SIR HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT26 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1975) (As the origin source remains state
practice, in 1941 Lauterpacht tellingly expressed the hope that the modern
world approached unity: “The disunity of the modern world is a fact; but so, in
a truer sense, is its unity. This essential and manifold solidarity, coupled with
the necessity of securing the rule of law and the elimination of war, constitutes
a harmony of interests which has a basis more real and tangible than the
illusions of the sentimentalist or the hypocrisy of those satisfied with the
existing status quo.”).
104. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later,
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 12 (2009).
105. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 69.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 71.
108. Oliver Gerstenberg, What International Law Should (Not) Become. A
Comment on Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 127 (2005).
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that any definitional authority is necessary. For even as the
narrative around jus cogens is so abstracted that it simply
ignores (albeit unsuccessfully) its own contingent state of being,
that denial cannot cancel the need for interpretation. Instead,
the denial opens up a struggle among international actors to
declare the content of jus cogens norms. As such, states—still
operating under the traditional, consent-based model of
international law—will continue to have little incentive to defer
to the (as of yet unknowable) fundamental legal principles that
jus cogens stands for.
This is not least because the interpretive struggle renders
the concept of jus cogens vulnerable to manipulation, as the
contestants in that struggle seek “to make their partial view of
the meaning appear to be the total view, their preference seem
like the universal preference.”109 To quote Koskenniemi, “‘human
rights,’ like any legal vocabulary, is intrinsically open-ended,
what gets read into it (or out of it) is a matter of subtle
interpretative strategy.”110 Indeed, “[f]rom its vague
introduction as some sort of social democracy, the idea of human
rights had been redeemed only as a concrete Cold War
position.”111 A rampant kind of normative contest across states
and legal bodies is risked, where such organs “are engaged in a
hegemonic struggle in which each hopes to have its special
interests identified with the general interest,”112 and “[e]ach
institution speaks its own professional language and seeks to
translate that into a global Esperanto, to have its special
interests appear as the natural interests of everybody.”113 As
Carl Schmitt pithily stated, “[w]hoever invokes humanity wants
to cheat.”114
And so proponents of jus cogens espouse their “Esperanto.”
But the universalism professed by jus cogens advocates may be
due at least in part to the belief (not necessarily mistaken) that
109. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition
and Revival, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 119 (2005) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter International Law in Europe].
110. Koskenniemi, supra note 104, at 9–10 (“If a British court is able to read
the indefinite detention of a person in Iraq as a human rights measure, then
that decision will become part of a shifting pattern of outcomes produced by
institutions having recourse to human rights vocabularies.”).
111. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 79
(2010).
112. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 65, at 562.
113. Id. at 578.
114. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 54 (1996).
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such norms must be so radically superior because they threaten
state sovereignty (a norm that in all likelihood no state will ever
agree to displace) and the foundational principles of
international law. After all, in the wake of World War II, the
prevailing sentiment behind the formalization of jus cogens
norms in Article 53 was to ensure that no state ever engaged in
similar atrocities again. But as demonstrated, merely expressing
that “universal preference” while deferring indefinitely the final,
authoritative determination of what constitutes a jus cogens
norm has rendered it meaningless. That is, without
determinative legal standards, the ILC’s idea of some
international “Rule of Law” has only unhelpfully deferred the
decision-making into “further procedure, interpretation, equity,
context, and so on.”115
Jus cogens thus suffers from “false universalism,” or the
universalism of empire: “a universal law, too, has no voice of its
own . . . all we hear are voices making claims under the law.” 116
In this way, the ostensible fixity of jus cogens risks collapse into
a “normative myth masking power arrangements that avoid
substantive meaning until later decision, thereby both
postponing and inviting political and ideological conflict.”117
Myths can rarely affect or bind real actors.
B. TREATIES: SOME CONTEXT
In a way, all law represents the transposition of certain
ideals into rules that create and limit rights and entitlements
among people. With respect to jus cogens norms, states have
barely even been able to agree on the scope of those ideals—in
large part because doing so is framed as an all or nothing
exercise. And, so long as the narrative remains binary, the cost
of committing to it will be too high: no state will agree to bind
itself to an inflexible set of universal principles whose scope is
yet to be determined by the practice of other states. Further,
even if states were able to agree on a list of norms qualifying for
peremptory status, that list would still be only a theoretical one
so long as courts or authoritative international bodies remain
reluctant to apply that list of norms in a concrete, predictable
fashion. Because abstract norms cannot on their own create
115. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 4, 28 (1990) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law].
116. Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe, supra note 109, at 118.
117. Christenson, supra note 30, at 590.
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justiciable rights, jus cogens will likely remain doomed to
languish in well-intentioned irrelevance.
At this juncture, one possibility deserves a moment of
consideration. What if jus cogens norms are acknowledged as
aspirational and context-driven? Perhaps a more useful way of
conceptualizing jus cogens norms—and lowering their cost of
commitment—lies in understanding the mandatory, universal
language through which they are formulated as intentionally
inconsistent with the fluctuating nature of customary law.
This statement may seem radical, but it is not. It relates to
a conception of modern customary law as a hybrid of declaratory
law and confirmatory practice. More specifically, the idea is
taken from some commentators’ formulation of treaty law, where
treaties use “mandatory language to prescribe a model of
conduct and provide a catalyst for the development of modern
custom.”118 As an example, Anthea Elizabeth Roberts has noted
that the various “fundamental” rights enumerated in the UDHR,
“expressed in mandatory terms,” have managed to attain
“customary status even though infringements are widespread,
often gross and generally tolerated by the international
community.”119 In this way, modern customary law might
represent “progressive development of the law masked as
codification by phrasing lex ferenda as lex lata.”120
Of course, if this conception of international law were
applied to jus cogens norms, and derogations were openly
tolerated, carried to its extreme logical conclusion, such a
narrative could be so flexible that any violation of a jus cogens
norm might be acceptable. This would be an incoherent result,
and not one borne out by treaty law.
Traditional treaties may suffer from some degree of
normative free-for-all,121 but to a manageable extent. That is
because in many cases nowadays, “to agree to a treaty is to agree
on a continued negotiation with [] reference to contextual dealstriking.”122 Treaties generally involve parties’ ready

118. Roberts, supra note 46, at 763.
119. Id. at 763 (quoting OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 335 (1991)).
120. Id.
121. See Weil, supra note 11, at 414 (exploring the issue of “soft law” as
compared to “hard law”).
122. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between
Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) [hereinafter Koskenniemi,
The Fate of Public International Law].
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acknowledgement of the negotiating reality and the factual and
historical context against which that negotiation takes place.123
This is so even as, for instance, the notion of “peace” may call for
interpretation,124 and even though much treaty vocabulary
might be formulated in the language of the aspirational.125
Ultimately, there are specific historical contexts that give
rise to the treaty—that is, real events—that (usually) underpin
the binding rules and concretely-referenced entitlements that a
treaty’s signatories have formally consented to. This is most
easily seen in the treaties enacted at the end of international
conflict, where any given peace settlement has its place in a
larger, ever-evolving narrative of international history and
process.126 A fixed narrative of what occurred must be
established. Negotiations with the very leaders who may have
perpetrated atrocities must be held.127 Ideological compromises
must be made. But in the end, binding rules are created (and
states readily consent to them) because they acknowledge the
necessary malleability of ideals.128
123. See Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4
EUR. J. INT’L L. 305, 335 (1993).
124. See Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice, supra note
72, at 12–13 (“[T]he word peace is freely used in the context of ending conflicts
or ensuring transition to non-tyrannical regimes but without being defined or,
more particularly, without any identification of what the peace goal is or how
long the purported peace is designed to last. There is therefore a wide range to
what peace can mean. In the political discourse of ending conflicts it ranges
from the cessation or absence of hostilities to popular reconciliation and
forgiveness between social groups previously in conflict with one another. It also
includes the removal of a tyrannical regime or leader, and the effectuation of a
regime change. The processes of attaining peace, whatever the intended
outcomes may be, vary in accordance with the type of conflict, its participants,
the level of victimization, the manner in which the victimization occurred, other
destructive conduct by opposing groups, and popular perceptions of what
occurred, as well as the future expectations of popular reconciliation between,
or co-existence among opposing groups. Peace, therefore, encompasses a wide
range of policy options, some of which could be combined to attain it.”).
125. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 11, at 414.
126. See Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice, supra note
72, at 26 (“[L]arge-scale victimization arising out of international crimes is
never safely tucked away in the limbo of the past. Instead, it remains fixed in
time in an ongoing present that frequently calls for vengeance and longs for
redress. Victims need to have their victimization acknowledged, the wrongs
committed against them decried, and the criminal perpetrators, or at least their
leaders, punished, and compensation provided for the survivors.”).
127. See id. at 12 (“The grim reality is that in order to obtain peace,
negotiations must be held with the very leaders who frequently are the ones
who committed, ordered, or allowed terrible crimes to be committed.”).
128. See id. (“Thus, the choice presented to negotiators is whether to have
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Derogating from ideals is not always prudent, of course. The
consequences of the realities of negotiating a treaty may be
“grim,” and justice may be “bartered away for political
settlements.”129 However, setting aside whether the results are
the most just or the most normatively superior, the rights and
entitlements created through such a bartering process, I argue,
are more real and lasting—if only because states view them as
such (and here we return to the primacy of state consent)—than
the virtually non-existent rights and entitlements created by jus
cogens fundamentalist vocabulary. For example, as Weil has
noted, some believe “a customary rule prohibiting certain
nuclear tests has emerged from the 1963 Moscow Treaty,” even
though he accuses that treaty of suffering from the vagaries of
international “soft” commitment.130
By contrast, jus cogens is so weighed down by its claim to
unanimous acceptance by the “international community of
states as a whole” that, in effect, it will never bind states,
because the likelihood that states will agree to a set of universal,
all-or-nothing rules whose scope is yet inchoate and whose
enforcement might impinge upon their sovereignty is
vanishingly small. However, if the burden of absolute obligation
is lifted, and if the normative aspirations are humbled, treaties
concerning jus cogens norms could be much less costly for states
to enter into. Moreover, they could mark a helpful trend toward
applicable law or the development of relevant custom. State
sovereignty would not be so threatened, and leaving wiggle room
for potentially necessary “derogations” (while reality at the
peace or justice. Sometimes this dichotomy is presented along more
sophisticated lines: peace now, and justice some other time.”).
129. Id. (“Bartering away justice for political results, albeit in the pursuit of
peace is the goal of most political leaders who seek to end conflicts or facilitate
transitions to non-tyrannical regimes . . . the choice presented to negotiators is
whether to have peace or justice. Sometimes this dichotomy is presented along
more sophisticated lines: peace now, and justice some other time. The choice is,
however, frequently fallacious and the dichotomy may be tragically deceptive.”).
130. Weil, supra note 11, at 435. That treaty provides, for instance, that
“each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country,” as well as including numerous other exhortatory provisions. Id. at 414
(pointing to “numerous treaty provisions whereby the parties undertake merely
to consult together, to open negotiations, to settle certain problems by
subsequent agreement; and the purely hortatory or exhortatory provisions
whereby they undertake to ‘seek to,’ ‘make efforts to,’ ‘promote,’ ‘avoid,’ ‘examine
with understanding,’ ‘act as swiftly as possible,’ ‘take all due steps with a view
to,’ etc.”).
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moment the treaty is signed catches up to the ideals expressed
in the treaty), could foster much needed, concrete movement
toward universal acceptance of jus cogens norms.
C. NARRATIVE FRAMING
Treaties, ultimately, engage in a give and take between the
ideal and reality: they are “a form of governance, a profession, a
movement . . . turning text into deed, aspiration into
institution.”131 They further reflect the reality that narratives
themselves (peace, justice, compensatory rights) must be
bargained for as well. Finally, their bargained-for flexibility and
acknowledged need for continuing interpretation provide the
vehicles for international agreement on the content of binding
law that perhaps could not otherwise be agreed upon. Thus,
treaties reveal their signatories’ understanding that there exists
a “contextually determined equity:”132 they reflect honest
acknowledgement of the power struggle inherent in the
negotiating process—not only for present and future
entitlements to be formalized in the treaty’s text, but also in the
ongoing interpretive struggle over narrative.
Even though proponents of jus cogens may not readily
acknowledge as much, this kind of narrative struggle is easily
identified in the interpretive choices made when applying
peremptory norm-based narratives to legal disputes. For
instance, in the Palestine Wall case, the ICJ had the choice to
author its decision based on the laws of self-determination, selfdefense against terrorism, and human rights law.133 In another
example, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) effectively
overrode the challenges of certain national courts to the ECJ’s
131. David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Still Part
of the Problem?, in EXAMINING CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19,
20–21 (Robert Dickinson et al. eds., 2012).
132. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra note 115, at 31.
133. Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). See
Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, supra note 122, at 6;
Marjan Ajevski, Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law – Beyond
Conflict of Laws, 32 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 87, 88 (2014) (“[P]roblems of
international human rights and international criminal law seem to be
particularly acute in this sense since while they rest on an assumption of
normative unity due to their allegiance to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, this presumption can easily be threatened by increasing the number of
institutions that can authoritatively pronounce on the meaning of the regime
norms.”).
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jurisdiction and the supremacy of European community law by
interpreting it as a fundamental rights regime and thereby
confirming its supremacy over domestic law.134 And, for a more
hypothetical illustration:
An agreement between two States . . . to undertake
collective humanitarian intervention against a third
State engaged in gross human rights abuse of its own
citizens could be considered invalid as in conflict with a
jus cogens norm against forcible intervention in another
State. It could also be considered, however, as an
agreement in aid of a peremptory norm against the gross
abuse of human rights, justifying an exception to the
general norm against forcible intervention. The political
outcome would determine to a large extent the legitimacy
of the claim of invalidity of the original agreement.135
As these examples show, the normative framework matters,
and it can certainly influence international power dynamics:136
“[p]olitical intervention is today often a politics of re-definition,
that is to say, the strategic definition of a situation or a problem
by reference to a technical idiom so as to open the door for
applying the expertise related to that idiom.”137 To borrow a
134. See Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, supra note 122,
at 8.
135. Christenson, supra note 30, at 601.
136. See id.at 597 (“First, when Western nations refer concretely to
peremptory norms serving these yet undefined fundamental interests, they
tend to emphasize, in the liberal tradition, negative prohibitions against the
official use of force, genocide, slavery, slave trade, state torture, or arbitrary
state murder. Second, Third World nations tend to view jus cogens norms as a
category of legal order that prohibits ordinary, Euro-centric rules from
undermining an affirmative and emerging new international justice and
morality. Resenting the dominance by the West of the sources and biases of
international law, these countries emphasize self-determination, nonaggression, and human rights as among the most fundamental interests of
international society. Third, socialist nations tend to view the concept through
prisms seeing peaceful coexistence, progressive development, prohibition
against crimes against humanity, autonomy of States, non-intervention, and
defense of peace and security.”).
137. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, supra
note 104, at 11 (“Think about an everyday international occurrence such as the
transport of hazardous chemicals at sea. This can be conceptualized at least
through half a dozen vocabularies accompanied by the same number of forms of
expertise and types of preference: law of trade, law of transport, law of the
environment, law of the sea, ‘chemical law,’ and the law of human rights. Each
would have something to say about the matter. Each would narrate it as part
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concept from the realist critique of international law, “in law,
political struggle is waged on what legal words such as
‘aggression,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘self-defence,’ ‘terrorist’ or ‘jus
cogens’ mean, whose policy they will include, and whose they will
exclude.”138 Indeed, defining “aggression” took nearly twenty
years for the United Nations, and defining “terrorism”
stonewalled altogether.139 This especially matters because “the
problem is clearly less to explain why people who agree are
bound than why also those should be who do not and how one
should argue if interpretative controversies arise.”140
Thus, I argue—and explore more fully in Part V—the
imperative should be one of transforming the toothless narrative
surrounding jus cogens into a more powerful one. The current
narrative, where jus cogens draws its authority from a consentbased model that is somewhat irreparably at odds with the basic
concept of jus cogens (universal and non-derogable), will likely
never translate into legal rights and entitlements that can be
applied consistently by courts and international legal organs.
V. LEVERAGING NARRATIVE: AN ALTERNATIVE
FORMULATION OF JUS COGENS
A. TOWARDS COMPROMISE
There is nothing that inherently prevents states from acting
on behalf of some generalized international interest.141 To quote
Koskenniemi, “[s]urely our lack of certainty about whether or
not rape is covered under some definition of ‘crimes against
humanity’ can be no argument against taking all available
measures to prevent or punish it.”142 The absolute should not be
the enemy of the effective.
And yet, the absolutism of jus cogens guts its effectiveness:
the current framing of jus cogens as “absolute” creates a binary,
of a different set of human pursuits, values, and priorities.”).
138. Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe, supra note 109, at 119.
139. See
Koskenniemi,
International
Law
and
Hegemony: A
Reconfiguration, supra note 96, at 199–200.
140. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra note 115, at 27.
141. See
Koskenniemi,
International
Law
and
Hegemony: A
Reconfiguration, supra note 96, at 201–02, discussing the history of states
acting unilaterally to act in the interest of the collective international
community.
142. Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, supra note 95,
at 14–15.
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all-or-nothing choice for states that understandably makes them
skittish. For “[w]hatever view the speaker has taken on the
‘absolutes of international law’ the one thing they seem to agree
upon is that they are indeed ‘absolutes’ and, as such, call for total
commitment or total rejection.”143 But this is an unnecessary
opposition—and one that needlessly ratchets up the cost of
committing to such norms. For instance, jus cogens, viewed for
what it arguably is—the “global Esperanto” and “hegemonic
technique”144 of well-meaning jurists who laudably seek to
protect the (human) rights of individuals—might be more easily
committed to by state actors if the obligation were not absolutely
binary—and if the consequences of commitment were less
unknown.
If the rhetoric of jus cogens is shifted to acknowledge its
necessary contingency and incorporate the realities of
compromise, I believe that such norms—promoted through more
modest, incremental and concrete means—can be wielded with
just as much clout as the ILC could have hoped for, but with a
lowered cost of commitment and correspondingly higher chance
of obtaining state consent. Otherwise, if there can be no realistic
compromise that takes place—as it does, for instance, in treaty
drafting, reflecting the compromise necessary when authority is
diffused between sovereign state-authors—then without some
kind of clear legislative voice, jus cogens norms will never
achieve easy translation into legal entitlement. Without
compromise and context,
[T]heories that hope to ground law on justice, equity,
social necessity, development trends of history, and so
forth are always vulnerable to the charges of being
ideological, unable to demonstrate their correctness in a
non-circular fashion and framed in such general
language that it is impossible to draw conclusions from
them.145
Again, the binary opposition that jus cogens norms has created
is a false one, and one that impedes its effectiveness.

143. Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration,
supra note 96, at 198.
144. Id. at 199.
145. Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 566, 578 (1997).
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B. RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
It may be worth considering, here, another means of
lowering the cost of committing to jus cogens norms: the idea of
re-sourcing the authority for jus cogens norms in human
individuals. Rather than casting international legal rights as
those wielded by nation-states, it may be time to cast those
rights as the rights of the individual subjects of those states—so
that an affirmation of jus cogens norms is not automatically
equated with the limitation of a state’s ability to act and
therefore an encroachment on its sovereignty.
The outlines of this concept can be found in the very
invocation of jus cogens by international organizations and
international courts. The vocabulary surrounding the protection
of “fundamental” human rights in, for instance, the United
Nations Charter, refers to those rights as inhering in the
“human person:” the Charter affirms “the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small,”146 “respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion,”147 and “universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”148
These “fundamental human rights to be universally protected”
are exactly that: human rights. A parallel can be seen in
international jurisprudence surrounding peremptory norms: the
ICJ has referred to “elementary considerations of humanity”149
and emphasized “the essential dignity of the individual.”150 With
respect to erga omnes rules, the ICJ has affirmed similar
universal “obligations of a State to the international community
as a whole” regarding “the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person.”151
146. U.N. Charter pmbl. ¶ 2.
147. Id. ¶ 3.
148. U.N. Charter art. 55, ¶ 4.
149. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 218 (quoting Corfu Channel Case
(Alb. v. U.K.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 22).
150. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 4, ¶ 55 (Jan. 19, 1984).
151. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 33. Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 34 (Feb. 5) (citing
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (May 28)).
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In other words, a normative shift in jus cogens to conceiving
of them as the rights of the individual might not so much require
an overhaul of the international rights regime, as simply a
reframing of the narrative. Again, this is not as radical as it may
seem. Some commentators have in fact argued that one of the
current problems with international human rights law is that
while human rights were originally conceptualized as rights of
the individual, their legitimacy and protection rests in the power
of the states.152 Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have
proposed to address this disconnect by embracing a fiduciary
theory of rights, whereby “peremptory norms arise from a statesubject fiduciary relationship rather than from state consent,”
and as such, “the state and its institutions are fiduciaries of the
people subject to state power, and therefore a state’s claim to
sovereignty, properly understood, relies on its fulfillment of a
multifaceted and overarching fiduciary obligation to respect the
agency and dignity of the people subject to state power.”153
Such a shift would also approach more closely the public
order conception of jus cogens, in which peremptory norms
reflect the global community’s conscience, a conscience dedicated
to protecting human rights and the like.154 This conception
would also hew more closely to the original formulation of jus
cogens, and less closely to the formulation finally adopted as
Article 53 of the VCLT, which, in the end, depends wholly on
state consent.155
Also applicable to this analysis are (arguably) changing
notions of sovereignty itself. For instance, according to W.
Michael Reisman, “[i]nternational law still protects sovereignty,
but—not surprisingly—it is the people’s sovereignty rather than
the sovereign’s sovereignty.”156 He continues: “[u]nder the old
concept, even scrutiny of international human rights without the
permission of the sovereign could arguably constitute a violation
of sovereignty by its ‘invasion’ of the sovereign’s domaine
réservé.”157 Such a normative shift suggests that jus cogens

152. See e.g., Jamie Mayerfeld, Who Shall Be Judge?: The United States, the
International Criminal Court, and the Global Enforcement of Human Rights, 25
HUM. RTS. Q. 93, 108 (2003).
153. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 347.
154. Id. at 345.
155. See Weisburd, supra note 33, at 35.
156. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 869 (1990).
157. Id.
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norms can in all likelihood be similarly de-linked from the
“sovereign’s sovereignty.”
If such a de-linking were to occur, it stands to reason that
states could more easily bind themselves to uphold jus cogens
norms in a way that is not automatically reflective of some
amount of sovereignty being bartered away. This decoupling
could provide enormous practical benefits to those who are
protected under jus cogens—that is, everyone. Thus, the ICJ’s
affirmation in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the
Genocide Convention of the “common interest” of all states
begins to take on more meaning:
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely
humanitarian and civilizing purpose . . . .In such a
convention the contracting States do not have any
interest of their own; they merely have, one and all, a
common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those
high purposes which are the raison d’être of the
Convention.158
C. AFFIRMATIVE AND CONCRETE
If the cost of committing to jus cogens norms is thus
lessened, I believe that states’ reluctance to bind themselves to
upholding jus cogens norms will decrease as well. Shifting
authority to individuals helps dispense with the instinct to
express jus cogens in the binary vocabulary of the absolutely
non-derogable; the vocabulary of affirmation may be used
instead. Confirming the intention to protect the rights of its
subjects would (ideally) operate as an affirmation of a state’s
sovereignty, rather than subjecting that sovereignty to
encroachment by an inflexible, absolute commitment to Article
53 of the VCLT.
More basically, if the expectations around jus cogens norms
are lowered, that is, if such norms are more explicitly understood
as aspirational, I argue states could more easily agree to
incremental but binding entitlements in pursuit of that ideal. In
this scenario, reservations or compromises in any given
convention or agreement respecting jus cogens might simply
reflect practical constraints, not any fundamental opposition to
158. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, at 23 (May 28).
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a given jus cogens norm. Here, even the treaties that reflect the
“grim” reality of post-conflict compromise between peace and
justice can be instructive. For, like those treaties, jus cogensrelated agreements can reflect the reality of compromise and
negotiation. Such agreements might not completely eradicate
torture, for instance. But they would stand a greater chance of
creating binding law—even if modest—that forces signatories to
take concrete measures in pursuit of eradication—already a vast
improvement over what the current formulation of jus cogens
can(not) do.
Stripping jus cogens of its stubbornly fundamentalist,
mandatory vocabulary, and instead embracing “reflexivity, a
movement between theory and practice,”159 would, I argue,
greatly benefit the concept of jus cogens. Not only would doing so
increase the likelihood of affirmative state action, but this more
contextualized approach would also allow courts greater freedom
to incorporate jus cogens norms in their decisions. As it stands,
potentially overstating their position with respect to and overbinding themselves to non-negotiable, undeveloped law poses
such enormous cost to states and courts that they have
completely abrogated their duty to uphold jus cogens norms.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Jus cogens currently has mere “symbolic significance.”160
This will remain true so long as jus cogens remains mired in the
uncompromising vocabulary of the fundamental. However, while
the road to building jus cogens into the fabric of international
legal rights and entitlements will no doubt be long and
complicated, doing so certainly remains possible. For that
process to materialize, proponents must shift the narrative of jus
cogens and lower the cost of international commitment; they
must recognize its contingency and the enduring primacy of the
state-centric model of international law, engage with its

159. Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, supra note 95,
at 15.
160. Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens,
15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 66 (1993); see also Weisburd, supra note 33, at 1 (“[T]his
article seeks to show that the problem lies in the concept of jus cogens itself.
More specifically, the article intends to make the case that the concept is
intellectually indefensible – at best useless and at worst harmful in the practical
conduct of international relations.”).
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rhetorical limitations, and finally, jettison the weight of its allor-nothing fundamentalist rhetoric.
Advocates of jus cogens norms would do well to remember
the degree to which the choice of narrative interacts with the
translation of moral or legal ideals into legal and factual rights
and entitlements. It is useful to consider a reminder on this point
from Koskenniemi:
This play of narratives of unity and fragmentation is
quite central for the self-understanding of Western law,
often expressed in the tension between historical
‘positivity’ and rational ‘system.’ Developments in
seventeenth century law were told as a story about
progress from civil war to the united nation as well as
descent from the Christian community to sovereign
states. Eighteenth century natural jurisprudence —
Samuel Pufendorf in Germany, Adam Smith in Britain
—turned the Reformation fear of individualism and
human self-love into a scientific explanation for
enlightened absolutism on the one hand, and the wealth
of nations on the other, while the Kantian postulate of
the ‘unsocial sociability’ from 1784 remained the last
refuge for the faith of many a liberal internationalist
until well into the twentieth century. And today, when
every unifying deep-structure has been subjected to
demystifying deconstruction what will be left is
demystification deconstruction as the great unifying
myth.161
The war over jus cogens can be framed as a war over
narrative: over text and interpretation. And narrative—like
law—is human-made. Both can be shifted, and in the case of jus
cogens, both should be. Let us refocus the war, and negotiate an
end where the casualty will not be the loss of the ideal itself, but
rather, one where the outcome may reflect compromise, but in
doing so create binding law.

161. Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, supra note 122, at
25.

